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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Real option logic offers insights into how to deal with uncertain business environments. 
Therefore, the concept of real options has aroused considerable interest in recent years among 
both scholars and practitioners of strategic investments. As a result, a wide range of investments 
have been classified as real options such as taking out patents, subcontracting, R&D projects, 
founding new businesses, and entering into joint ventures (JVs) (e.g. Kester, 1981; Reuer & 
Leiblein, 2000; Van Mieghem, 1999). The widespread use of real option logic, combined with 
the fact that a gap between theoretical and empirical works remains to exist (Reuer, 2002), leaves 
open questions about the conditions under which real option logic is indeed applicable. At the 
same time, it is important to examine what variables are indeed suitable predictors within a real 
option framework, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. 
Theoretically, Adner and Levinthal (2004a, 2004b) called for attention to the boundary 
conditions of real option theory to strategic decision-making. They argued that the assumptions 
underlying the real option model are violated if variables such as the end-date of the underlying 
project are discretionary: “Because much attention in the management literature is focused on the 
ways in which the firm can affect outcomes and variances[…], it is important to examine what 
happens to the applicability of options logic as we move away from a world of wait and see to a 
world of “act and see,” in which uncertainty resolution is endogenous to firm activity” (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2004a: 76). This question is all the more relevant when applying real option logic to 
the study of JVs, as JVs represent both investments with strategic implications, and a choice of a 
governance mode that may encourage strategic behavior among partners.  
Empirically, some studies of JVs have found support consistent with real option theory, 
but others have not. Indeed, two prominent studies, by Folta (1998) and Reuer and Leiblein 
(2000), found that real option predictions were not supported with respect to the formation and 
consequences of JVs respectively. 
In this study, we aim to contribute to the literature by examining, theoretically and 
empirically, to what extent the real option logic accurately describes the initial equity shares 
taken by investors in JVs. Specifically, we examine whether various forms of uncertainty predict 
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the distribution of equity stakes in JVs in the way that real option logic suggests, depending on 
whether or not uncertainty can be resolved endogenously. We thus contribute to the literature on 
real options, JVs, and strategic decision-making more generally. We also demonstrate proper use 
of null-hypothesis tests with application to strategic and international management 
 
LITERATURE 
 
Joint Ventures and the Option to Acquire 
 
Shortly after the formalization of financial option theory, scholars recognized that options 
logic could be applied to corporate investments (Myers 1977). Such options are called “real 
options” and can be seen as contingent investment commitments in an asset or capability, rather 
than in a financial contract, which secure decision-making rights in the future (Trigeorgis, 1993). 
The insights and techniques from financial option pricing, which were carried over to the 
valuation of organizational resources investments, showed that the traditional Net Present Value 
(NPV) approach to valuing investments does not fully capture the value of management’s 
flexibility to adapt to unexpected market developments (Trigeorgis, 1995). Such flexibility is 
valuable because it can limit investors’ downside losses to their initial investments, while 
preserving the upside potential. This does not mean that the traditional NPV approach to valuing 
investments should be put aside, but rather that it should be expanded to take into account both a 
passive NPV component and a dynamic option value component (Pindyck, 1988). Each of the 
value components can be captured in a different way and therefore requires a different sort of 
investment (Chi & McGuire 1996).  
Among the first to apply real option theory to JVs, Kogut (1991) argued that firms can 
capture the upside potential of a JV by buying out the partner in a later stage when favorable 
information becomes available. At the same time the investment in a JV limits the downside risk.  
Subsequently, several other scholars have looked at JVs through a real option lens (e.g. 
Chi & McGuire, 1996; Reuer, 2002; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000; Reuer & Tong, 2005). These 
studies provided some evidence of JVs as real options and showed that the distribution of initial 
ownership shares is of particular interest. On the one hand, an investor who tries to capture the 
static NPV part will take a share as large as possible, to fully capture the future cash flows. In the 
extreme, this will lead to a wholly-owned subsidiary instead of a JV (Seth & Kim, 2000). On the 
other hand, an investor who aims to capture the dynamic real options part will invest in a smaller 
share because this limits the downside risk while leaving open the opportunity to capture the 
upside potential of the JV (see Chi & McGuire, 1996; Reuer 2002). Hence, a JV allows the 
investors in the option to acquire the other party’s stake (call option) and we can expect the firm 
investing in this option to take a smaller initial equity share in the JV. 
 
Real Option Theory and Uncertainty 
 
The value of a real option is a function of the same five factors that determine the value 
of financial options, i.e.: the value of the underlying asset, the strike price, the time to maturity, 
the risk-free rate and the uncertainty surrounding the underlying asset (Seth & Kim, 2000). 
However, one of these, uncertainty, has been by far the most prominent throughout the real 
option literature on JVs, because of its natural appeal to strategy and management scholars. 
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On the one hand, researchers have used formal models to study the theoretical benefits 
and cost of investing in different kinds of strategic real options and to assess how flexibility can 
generate value under conditions of uncertainty (e.g. Chi & McGuire, 1996; Kulatilaka, 1995). 
These models focus on one or at most two different sources of uncertainty each. On the other 
hand, researchers have examined empirically whether JV decisions are consistent with real 
option theory. Although several studies, mainly those focusing on exogenous sources of 
uncertainty, found results consistent with real option predictions (e.g. Kogut, 1991) other studies 
have found results which are inconsistent with real option predictions (e.g Folta, 1998; Reuer & 
Leiblein, 2000).  
Overall, multiple sources and concepts of uncertainty have been advanced in real option 
research. However, very few studies have contrasted the effects of two or more sources of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, differences in concepts of uncertainty may explain some of the 
inconsistencies found in the empirical literature with respect to JVs. To address this, we seek to 
contrast multiple sources of uncertainty. In this respect, the gaps between theoretical and 
empirical literatures suggest that a critical distinction is whether or not uncertainty is exogenous 
to the firm’s influence. 
 
THEORY 
 
Carrying over the insight from financial options to real options is what makes real option 
theory particularly appealing: It deals with one of firms’ most important challenges by linking 
current strategic decisions with uncertainty about future outcomes. However, the carry-over is 
problematic if the conditions for the resolution of the uncertainty depart from the theory (Adner 
& Levinthal, 2004a). In this respect, two forms of uncertainty can be distinguished: exogenous 
uncertainty and endogenous uncertainty (Folta, 1998; Roberts & Weitzman, 1981).   
Exogenous uncertainty is uncertainty of which the resolution is unaffected by the actions 
of the firm (Chi & Seth, 2001; Roberts & Weitzman, 1981). By contrast, endogenous uncertainty 
is resolved (at least in part) by the actions of the firm itself. More specifically, the degree and the 
pace of resolution of endogenous uncertainty depend on the firm’s initiatives over time (Roberts 
& Weitzman, 1981).  
We argue that while real option theory should apply in the case of exogenous uncertainty 
resolution, it need not when uncertainty resolution is endogenous. The case of exogenous 
uncertainty corresponds to models of financial options, where it is assumed that uncertainty is 
resolved independently of the investor’s behavior. If this property carries over to investments 
that are non-financial in nature, the real option logic should hold (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). 
Furthermore, Dixit & Pindyck (1994) argue that exogenous uncertainty increases the value of 
waiting for new information and makes committing resources early less attractive, because 
investing will not influence how uncertainty is resolved. Hence, options pricing models should 
be applicable. 
However, when uncertainty resolves endogenously, three different but related arguments 
can be made whereby real option logic will not hold anymore. Firstly, option valuation models 
will break down because their underlying assumptions are violated as investors are not pure 
price-takers anymore (e.g. Black & Scholes, 1973). Secondly, under endogenous uncertainty, 
firms have different investment incentives than under exogenous uncertainty. Namely, they will 
have an incentive to invest and commit resources rather than wait (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). 
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Thirdly, the flexibility of targets renders real option theory ineffective as a decision-making tool 
(Adner & Levinthal 2004a). 
For these reasons, we expect that while real option predictions will accurately describe 
firms’ responses to exogenous uncertainty, they will not accurately describe their responses to 
endogenous uncertainty. To explicate this difference further, we derive six predictions, three of 
which deal with sources of uncertainty that resolve exogenously and three with sources of 
uncertainty that resolve endogenously. 
 
Exogenously Resolved Uncertainty 
 
In our first set of predictions we look at economic, local institutional and exchange rate 
uncertainty which are all factors that can have an impact on the value of an investment (e.g. 
Davis & North, 1971; Miller, 1992; Oxelheim & Wihlborg, 1991). These factors are determined 
in a complex system consisting of markets and/or sovereign governments. Thus, for individual 
firms it is extremely difficult, if not outright impossible in larger economies, to influence these 
sources of uncertainty. Therefore, we argue that economic, local institutional and exchange rate 
uncertainty will be resolved exogenously. Accordingly, we expect real option logic to hold for 
these three sources of exogenous uncertainty. Therefore, we predict that higher levels of 
economic, local institutional and exchange rate uncertainty, respectively lead to a higher 
propensity to make a call option investment, and thereby to a smaller share in the JV.  
 
Endogenously Resolved Uncertainty 
 
In a second set of predictions we focus on three other sources of uncertainty, namely 
cultural, R&D-related, and scope-related uncertainty. Each of these three sources of uncertainty 
can be influenced by the actions of the partners in the JV. Such actions include, but are not 
limited to, investing in learning, cultural training, increasing the level of coordination and 
intimate face-to-face contact. Thus, unlike the sources of exogenous uncertainty described in our 
first three predictions, these three sources of uncertainty can be resolved endogenously. This 
entails a departure from the assumptions underlying real option logic. Therefore, we do not 
expect cultural uncertainty, R&D-related uncertainty, and scope-related uncertainty to determine 
the value of a call option and thereby influence the propensity to make a call option investment. 
Hence, we predict that these three sources of endogenous uncertainty have no significant effect 
on the distribution of equity shares among partners.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
 
We test our predictions with data on equity JVs (EJVs) formed in China between 1979 
and 1996 and involving a foreign partner. The data for the period contained 6,472 two-party 
Sino-foreign EJVs. The data have been shown to be reliable and consistent with FDI data from 
independent non-Chinese sources and parts of the data have been used in several published 
studies (e.g. Pan, 1996).  
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Variables 
 
Our dependent variable is the percentage of foreign share in Sino-foreign EJVs which 
under Chinese law can range from 25% to 99.9%. As discussed earlier, a foreign investor who 
wants to capture the static NPV part will be more likely to take a large share while an investor 
who makes a call option investment will take a smaller share (Chi & McGuire, 1996; Reuer, 
2002). To capture our six sources of uncertainty, we use a number of well established and often 
used variables such as the Euromoney country risk index and Kogut and Singh’s (1988) cultural 
distance index. Furthermore, we control for a number of additional factors: the contractual 
duration of the JV, the total size of the JV, the number of years of prior experience of the foreign 
partners in China, period fixed-effects, and industry fixed-effects. 
 
Estimation and Testing Null Hypotheses 
 
We have to consider two important characteristics of our data when choosing the 
appropriate method to test our predictions. Firstly, our dependent variable is censored because 
the Chinese government only allows foreign ownership to range from a minimum of 25% to a 
maximum of 99.9%. However, foreign investors might actually prefer an ownership share 
outside this range but end up taking a share somewhere between 25% and 99.9%, choosing the 
value closest to their true preference. Not controlling for the censored dependent variable is 
likely to lead to biased results (Greene, 2003). Secondly, our data is hierarchically structured, 
with units at two different but nested levels, i.e. the individual JVs and the country of origin of 
the foreign investor. Failing to take into account the multilevel structure of the data would 
possibly result in underestimated standard errors (Hox, 1995). Taking these two issues into 
account, we use a random-intercept multilevel Tobit model with double-censoring.  
 In order to show that there is no true relationship between two variables, as we predict for 
the sources of endogenous uncertainty, proper null-hypothesis tests have to be used. Therefore, 
we conduct a power analysis as proposed by Cohen (1990). Although power analysis is not 
frequently used in strategic or international management literature, it is commonly used in other 
disciplines such as psychology to show conclusively that there is only a negligible relationship 
between two variables. Most attention in the strategy and management literature has gone to the 
possibility of rejecting the null hypothesis when in fact it is correct, i.e. making a Type I error. 
Similarly, a test can be conducted to evaluate the statistical probability of failing to reject the null 
hypothesis when it is in fact false, i.e. making a Type II error. Null-hypothesis tests allow to 
accept a null hypothesis with the same level of confidence (low probability of a Type II error) 
that is generally accepted to reject the null hypothesis (low probability of a Type I error). 
Furthermore, in order to ensure the validity of our null-hypothesis tests, we conduct our power 
analysis more conservatively than generally suggested (e.g. Cohen, 1990). 
 
RESULTS 
 
Our findings are consistent with our predictions and with real option logic for each source 
of exogenous uncertainty. More specifically, we find a negative and significant relationship 
(p<.05) between foreign share and economic uncertainty. Similarly, we find a negative and 
significant relationship (p<.05) between foreign share and local institutional uncertainty. Finally, 
we find that foreign investors will take a smaller share when exchange rate uncertainty increases.  
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 Proper null-hypothesis tests show conclusively that the three endogenous sources of 
uncertainty have no significant effect on the distribution of equity shares among partners. We 
find no relationship between foreign share and cultural uncertainty (probability of Type II error < 
.01). Similarly, we find no relationship between foreign share and R&D uncertainty (probability 
of Type II error < .01). Finally, we find no relationship between foreign share and the scope of 
the JV (probability of Type II error < .01). 
We also look at the practical magnitudes of the predicted effects. This confirms that our 
results are both practically and statistically significant in case of exogenous uncertainty, and that 
the effects of the endogenous uncertainty variables are negligible. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we theorize and find empirically that initial alliance governance decisions, 
as represented by equity stakes upon entering into JVs, conform to real option predictions when 
uncertainty is exogenous but not when uncertainty is endogenous. These results advance our 
understanding of the boundary conditions for applying real option theory, and help explain 
inconsistencies in past research findings. 
Furthermore, the findings of this study have a number of implications for both scholars 
and practitioners. Firstly, our framework makes it possible to identify under what conditions an 
investment can truly be expected to represent a real option. A wide range of investments have 
been classified as real option investments, and previous empirical results have shown 
inconsistent support for real option theory. We argue that this may be because real option logic 
might inadequately characterize investments which are subject to endogenously resolving 
uncertainty, such as some investments in joint R&D. However, our research also confirms that 
real option theory has strong predictive power in the presence of exogenous uncertainty. 
Secondly, using real options metaphorically may be very appealing and useful. However, this 
metaphor should only be used while keeping carefully in mind what sources of uncertainty the 
option is meant to hedge, and whether the uncertainty resolves endogenously. Thirdly, 
researchers and practitioners should be aware of the boundaries of the theory when they evaluate 
potential investments. Inappropriately using real option logic to value projects is likely to lead to 
suboptimal decision making. Adner and Levinthal (2004a, 2004b) argued that practitioners might 
be able to make use of real option logic when uncertainty resolves endogenously, but only if they 
compensate for endogeneity by putting control systems into place and by changing the design of 
the organization. However, this is likely to come at a trade-off, as uncertainty might resolve 
slower or not at all as a result of such mechanisms, and the organizational costs may outstrip the 
option value thus obtained. Finally, this study also has important implications for joint venture 
research. Our results confirm that a real option perspective can be useful in modeling equity 
share decisions in JVs, but add an important caveat that this is only true when uncertainty 
resolves exogenously. Furthermore, while much has been written about conditions under which 
JVs are more or less appropriate (i.e. why JVs exist), our model describes determinants of the 
optimal level of ownership for a foreign investor. This is especially relevant in dealing with 
highly (exogenously) uncertain markets, which is a basic reason to consider JVs in the first 
place. 
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